Poverty, inequality, and development through the lens of inclusive finance.
Editor's Note: Of particular note, this Tuesday (September 15th) at 10am Eastern there is a special edition of faiVLive in Spanish covering Digital Financial Services in Latin America. I'll be hosting with Gabriela Zapata moderating, and Kiki DelValle, Barbara Magnoni, and Xavier Faz will be joining us. Register here.
I apologize in advance if the final links on resilience undermine your resilience at the beginning of the week.
–Tim Ogden
Read MoreEditor's Note: I feel like the typical "everyone is gone in August" thing hasn't been happening this year, but there is so much that's different that I can't really tell. And while I took some time off in July, and even went somewhere, it didn't feel like a vacation since there was still so much effort needed figuring out what the boys and I could do in a time of distancing and lockdowns. I hope you have had some time mentally away, but you know, not all of your time mentally away.
--Tim Ogden
1. Microfinance: It's not often that I have a plain microfinance item these days, but there are some important specifically microfinance points of interest this week. First it's the 10th anniversary edition of the Microfinance Barometer. There's an interesting piece in it on the evolution of the Barometer's coverage, and one on "digitalisation: risk or opportunity?" which I automatically like because of the framing. Also, there's an article asking whether financial inclusion and microfinance are the same thing, which I was kind of taken aback by since I mostly hear these days about whether there is a meaningful and useful difference between inclusion and health. I didn't know anyone was still equating microfinance with inclusion. But perhaps the most interesting thing is a small snippet of data on Portfolio at Risk: the trend is definitely upward toward 7% PAR30, which is well above the historic range of "good practice" microcredit. Is it a sign of MFIs learning to take more risk? Or that they are being pressured by digital entrants to be more aggressive? Or something else?
This week the European Microfinance Platform released Financial Inclusion Compass 2019, the report on their annual survey of trends in financial inclusion (note, not trends in microfinance). You'll hear more about Compass in coming weeks as the eMFP team will be taking over the faiV one week soon. In my quick initial look through the thing I found most interesting is the divergence between how MFIs and investors are rating various issues. Specifically, MFIs still put human resources issues at the top of their list of concerns--it's still a problem attracting, training and retaining staff apparently. Which should raise questions of digital security: if MFIs can't retain basic banking staff, what hope do they have of attracting and retaining cybersecurity staff? (Yes, I'm going to keep banging on this drum for a long time to come.)
Speaking of digital finance, one more thing for this week: MicroSave's full report on the state of digital credit in Kenya is full of fascinating (and scary) details. Like, "Between 2016 and 2018, "86% of loans that Kenyans took were digital in nature." Yes, indeed, it sounds like the MFIs are under significant pressure. But so you don't think I'm letting my confirmation bias run totally rampant, here's a recent blog post from MicroSave highlighting the positive trends in digital credit in Kenya, which include rising loan quality (that is, if you consider repayment rates a pure measure of loan quality; sorry, not sorry). Especially since there is also a new report from FSDKenya "evaluating the conduct and practice of digital lending" there. It includes fun stories like relatives of borrowers being threatened with being blacklisted at credit agencies if they don't compel repayment. Loan quality is definitely improving.
2. Migration: Did I mention I have a new paper with Michael Clemens on reframing the migration research agenda? Oh yes, I'm sure I did, but nevertheless, here it is again.
But there is also some brand new stuff. First, here's a look at the impact of massive out-migration from Galicia since 1860. The initial outflow lowered literacy rates for about a decade but then the trend reversed with large gains in human capital at origin that have persisted for more than a century. The mechanism: both remittances from the migrants to fund education back in Galicia and the transmission of norms about the importance of education.
There's also a new study of the impact of the end of the Bracero program which allowed Mexicans to migrate for agricultural jobs in the United States beginning during World War II. When the program ended, there was a sudden massive drop in migrants. What happened? Well, awhile ago, Michael, Ethan Lewis and Hannah Postel had a paper showing there was no effect on employment or wages for native-born workers. This new paper by Muly San explains why: large investment in technology to reduce the labor needed to harvest the crops that Bracero's had been employed harvesting (and not in other crops.)
Drawing heavily on Michael's research there's also a new special report from The Economist making the case for more migration to make the world a better place. And it doesn't even include how migrants seem to be the best defenders America's institutions have right now.
And here's a story about how the huge inflow of Venezuelan refugees into Colombia has made it the fastest growing country on the continent--and apparently about the most stable country on the continent right now.
Meanwhile, if you're wondering what's wrong with America you're not alone. Here's a partial answer that I've featured before: Americans keep setting new records for immobility.
1. Good Economics: I’m pretty jealous of the luck that the editor who signed Esther and Abhijit to write a new book with a big picture view of economics and development and managed to have it scheduled to come out just a few weeks after they won the Nobel has (or alternatively I’m not jealous at all of the eternity of suffering they will have from selling their soul to make this happen). It is pretty remarkable timing regardless of how it came about.
The official release isn't until later this week, but there’s already a good amount of stuff out there, and the book seems likely to generate a lot of conversation. Here’s an excerpt that outlines their perspective on migration (it’s good and there should be more of it). Here’s an excerpt of their perspective on trade (it’s not as good as you’ve heard). Here’s a thread from David McKenzie contrasting the two.
I’m told a review copy is headed my way, and if so I’m sure I’ll have more to say about the book in future weeks.
2. Global Development: It feels like quite some time since I’ve been able to feature some big picture things happening in the development space. So here’s a round-up of some pretty diverse things on that front.
David Malpass has been in charge at the World Bank for long enough to start seeing some changes. Here’s a perspective on how the annual meetings were different this time around. And here’s a piece on how Malpass seems to be trying to shift toward more attention at the individual country level than on global or regional issues. I guess no one will be surprised if the Bank does little on the climate change front while he is in charge.
It’s been well more than a decade of pretty remarkable economic growth on average in sub-Saharan Africa. In some countries that has meant substantial progress on reducing poverty headcounts; in others not so much. Via Ken Opalo here’s a paper that proposes an explanation for the pretty bi-modal distribution of countries that have made progress on poverty and those that haven’t. Spoiler: Acemoglu and Robinson and those who like path dependence stories probably agree.
Bolivia is in crisis right now with real uncertainty about what the next few weeks, much less months, will hold. It would be interesting to see a systematic review of outcomes for countries where there have been coups and ones where there's been "sort of" a coup. But Bolivia is in remarkably better shape than some of the other countries in Latin America that elected populist lefitsts around the same time. Here’s a Twitter conversation between Justin Sandefur, Dany Bahar and Alice Evans (and later Pseudoerasmus weighs in) on the pretty unique set of economic policies and macro-conditions that account for that.
China’s efforts to play a large role in developing countries has been a topic for awhile now. But there’s still a lot of questions about what exactly China’s influence and impact on developing countries will be. Here’s a CGD piece on what the Belt and Road Initiative will look like in 10 years.
Russia is the new scary story in African "investment." A few weeks ago Russia hosted a summit with leaders of African countries. So what does Russian involvement in Africa look like? Here's a claim that Russia is sending mercenaries to Libya with the intention of increasing migrant flows to Europe to destabilize countries there. What are the chances that the Banerjee and Duflo chapter on migration will be wildly influential and cause the Russian strategy to backfire?
On the migration front, here’s Michael Clemens and Jimmy Graham on how demographics are going to change the flows of migrants to the United States from Central America--I don’t think they factor in the possible impact of Russian mercenaries.
3. Digital Finance: Here are some important stories about digital finance that you may not have noticed. If that sounds like a familiar opening, well, yes, OK, I’m going to hammer on this theme for a bit--be prepared it’s likely to be a regular fixture, at least until I feel like it’s gets regular enough attention in conversations about fintech, mobile money and other things digital.
Nikkei--the Japanese financial news organization and owner of the FT--lost $29 million in a phishing scam. UniCredit--the Italian bank--exposed 3 million customer records in a data breach. Web.com, one of the largest domain name registrars in the world, was hacked a few weeks ago and exposed 22 million records. What'sApp was also hacked, apparently by an Israeli firm that proceeded to spy on 1400 people in 20 countries.
Anyone feeling confident that microfinance institutions or even major mobile money providers are really immune to these security breaches that are affecting even highly sophisticated companies spending multi-millions on cybersecurity? If you are, please print out this tweet and tape it to your monitor.
OK, here's something not on the security question: a paper on the economic effects of money based on Spanish history: whether or not shipments of silver made it back to Spain from the New World had a big impact on the literal supply of money. So what does this have to do with digital finance? I think it's a useful explanation for the Jack and Suri finding about the growth effects of mobile money in Kenya.
1. US Household Finance (and Great Convergence/Corrupted Economy): If you've been paying attention to global news, you have no doubt deduced a pattern that many are remarking on: mass protests in many countries that are linked in more than trivial ways to the cost of living, corrupted economies and frustration with a subverted political process: Chile, Ecuador, Lebanon, Hong Kong are just a few. Here's the New York Times on that pattern with discussion of similar situations in nearly 10 more countries.
In the sense that these episodes of mass unrest stem back to "pocketbook" issues the United States is an outlier--not that the cost of living and unequal access to opportunity aren't issues--but that they haven't yet lead to mass uprisings. There are lots of reasons for that of course, including relatively low unemployment and at least some consistent economic growth. But the underlying issues just aren't that different. Here's a new report from the JP Morgan Chase Institute on how much savings US households need to weather the typical ups and downs in their income and spending needs. There's a lot to dig into in the report, and I'm still not convinced we understand volatility enough to offer prescriptions, but this is a big step in the right direction. The report finds that US families need 6 weeks of take-home income to weather a simultaneously income dip and expense spike, and that 65 percent of households don't have that.
For a more personal take on how budgets are being squeezed, here's the NYT with a in-depth look at four households' budgets.
2. SMEs: The way I see things there are two research questions at the top of the agenda: 1) What distinguishes SMEs/entrepreneurs that grow, and create net new jobs and long-lived profitable businesses (I honestly care less about high growth because I care more about short- and medium-term income effects), and 2) What are the barriers specifically for women in becoming one of those types of entrepreneurs.
There are two new-ish papers I came across this week, one on each of those questions. First, here's a paper that tries to establish some objective criteria for distinguishing between "necessity" and "opportunity" entrepreneurs, using their prior work history as the main data source. Using data from Germany and the US they find that opportunity entrepreneurs start more growing businesses (surprise!) and that 80 to 90% of entrepreneurs are opportunity entrepreneurs. The relevance to places outside of a handful of developed countries with well-functioning and tightly-integrated labor markets notwithstanding, I don't find the approach particularly convincing. I can think of lots of different ways to conceptualize what job history means in terms of "opportunity" vs. "necessity" and it doesn't take into account that a lot of "opportunity" entrepreneurs are likely just wrong about the opportunity (or their necessity). But it's a useful paper for thinking about these issues.
The second paper is a new working paper from Seema Jayachandran that I just came across this morning, so I haven't had a chance to really look at it yet. But based on the abstract, it's definitely worth taking a look at. She "reviews the recent literature in economics on small-scale entrepreneurship (microentrepreneurship) in low-income countries" with "special attention to unique issues that arise with female entrepreneurship."
3. Digital Finance: Here are some important stories about digital finance that you may not have noticed. A major German manufacturer is still down more than a week after being hit by a ransomware attack. Seventeen iPhone apps have been removed from the app store after researchers discovered they were using a clever way to hide and deliver malware. Two of the most popular VPN providers in the world were hacked recently. A new information-gathering trojan is rapidly gaining popularity with hackers, in part because it's "malware as a service" where you can rent server space and get technical support all for just $200 a month.
1. Jobs: I've written a good bit here on the "Great Convergence" from the perspective of financial inclusion--that the US and middle-income countries have more in common in that domain than they have ever had--but another version of the "Great Convergence" is the common focus on jobs in countries across the per-capita income spectrum.
It's useful to put the current convergence in historical perspective--the recognition that creating jobs was critical and that "national champion" industrial development was not creating them played a large role in the development of the microfinance movement. The failure of microcredit to produce much beyond self-employment alternatives to casual labor has brought job creation, and especially job creation through SMEs, back to the top of the agenda of international development. At the same time, the failure of richer economies to produce very many "quality" jobs in the 10 years since the Great Recession (and arguably since the 1970s) or for the foreseeable future has put the question of jobs at the top of the list of concerns for policymakers in those countries.
Paddy Carter, the director of research for CDC (UK, not US), and Petr Sedlacek have a new report on how DFIs and social investors should think about job creation that lays out some of the issues (e.g. boosting productivity can both create and destroy jobs) quite nicely. MIT's "Work of the Future Task Force" also has a new report, this more from the perspective of policymakers in wealthier countries, with a call to focus on job quality more than job quantity. Stephen Greenhouse has a new book on dignity at work, which of course has a lot to do with job quality. Here's a talk he gave recently at Aspen's Economic Opportunities Program.
Seema Jayachandran has a new working paper on a specific part of the jobs conversation: how social norms limit women's labor market participation and what might be done about that. For me it also opens the question about microcredit-driven self-employment being a higher "dignity" job for women in many contexts than the jobs that are available to them otherwise. More on that in a moment.
2. Household Finance: I don't have a lot of links here, just some thoughts from conversations in the last few days. But to kick things off, Felix Salmon had a nice gibe at financial literacy this week that had my confirmation bias going. But in hindsight, I actually disagree: teaching financial literacy actually doesn't seem to be that hard based on the many papers that show that running a class leads to passing a financial literacy test. The hard part is making higher financial literacy pay off in terms of changed behavior. But there I agree with Felix's basic point: higher financial literacy doesn't lead to improved decision making for the poor or the wealthy. The wealthy just have more structure and protection (both formal in terms of regulation and practices at private firms who know better than to routinely screw profitable customers, and informal in terms of slack and cushion) from bad choices. On the flip side, Joshua Goodman has a new paper in the Journal of Labor Economics that finds that more compulsory high school math leads African-American students to complete more math coursework and to higher paying jobs (there's a nice little estimate that the return to additional math courses makes up half of the gains from an additional year of school).
Part one of "more on that in a moment" is that Seema with a rockstar list of development economists (Erica Field, Rohini Pande, Natalia Rigol, Simone Schaner and Charity Troyer Moore) has another new paper on whether access to, deposits into and training on using a personal bank account affects women's labor supply and gender norms. They find that it does increase women's labor supply and shifts norms to be more accepting of women working. Here's the indispensible Lyman Stone with a somewhat skeptical take on the interpretation of the data.
Finally, in a conversation with Northern Trust this week about their financial coaching work (see a recent summary here) a really fascinating insight came up: people in the coaching programs seem to have much more success when "saving" is framed as "debt reduction" than when it's framed as "saving." These sort of things always grab my attention because Jonathan's paper Borrowing to Save was a seminal piece for my interest and thinking in financial inclusion. But it also got me thinking: what would happen if retirement savings programs were framed as debt + loss aversion? Specifically, if when you started a job, the employer said: "I'm loaning you $10K, deposited into an IRA and you owe me $x monthly, until you pay it off--and if you don't I take it back." Obviously you couldn't run an experiment like that in the US because of regulations, but is there somewhere you could? Maybe someone has already done it? Let me know if you have any thoughts.
1. Digital Finance: Is a tide turning on digital credit? Old hands in the microfinance world like MicroSave and CGAP have been highlighting concerns about digital credit for the last few years, but the non-specialist community hasn't seemed to notice until recently. In late August Bloomberg had a quick hit piece with an eyebrow-raising headline, "This Nobel-Prize Winning Idea is Instead Piling Debt on Millions," which is likely the way the general public will perceive this despite the protests of insiders that telecoms/fintechs making instant loans at high rates with minimal customer engagement doesn't have much in common with traditional microcredit. A more serious treatment,"Perpetual Debt in the Silicon Savannah" was published in the Boston Review the same week, though it's frustrating in its own ways, notably the lack of engagement with the global/historical context of small dollar lending or with the research from financial diaries.
In both articles there are two additional issues that I wish received more attention. First, the value of liquidity management. The authors of the Boston Review piece, Emma Park and Kevin Donovan (both historian/anthropologists), spend a good deal of time talking about the "zero-balance economy" creating a situation where consumers can be exploited without engaging on the need for services to manage liquidity when you have low and volatile incomes. Second, the kind of default rates being hinted at in these articles raise serious questions about the business models and sustainability of digital lenders. Tala, one of the larger digital credit providers in Kenya (and elsewhere) just raised another $110 million. How much of that money is covering losses? I would love to see some analysis of what sustainable default rates are for digital credit.
Shifting gears a bit, the reason that the Kenya specifically and East Africa more generally remain in the spotlight on digital finance is the ubiquity of access. But ubiquity can't be assumed and in general I would say not enough attention is being paid to what happens when ubiquity fails. Here I don't mean places where everyone knows service is unreliable, but places and times where service is unexpectedly unavailable. Here's a story about the problems that can create in the US with ZipCar customers stranded in the "wilderness" because of a lack of signal leaves them unable to unlock or start the vehicles. More seriously, though, is the concern when access is limited because of political reasons. Here's a story about the rise in government-directed internet shutdowns. Of course there is the big concern of how these shutdowns would affect people who have adopted digital finance and find themselves unable to spend. But I also wonder if Tala investors have priced in the risk to the business model of internet shutdowns.
Internet shutdowns are a blunt tool. We should also be concerned about more fine-grained tools in the hands of governments or private companies. I'm old enough to remember when one of the highlighted "benefits" of digital finance was that it created an audit trail of transactions. Here's a story about how much data about you leaks to unknown parts of the internet when you use the Amazon Prime card and the Apple Card. And finally, here's a new report on cash as a public good from IMTFI, sponsored by the International Currency Association, which I am fascinated to discover exists (though I'm even more fascinated to discover the International Banknote Designers Association, which is one of its members).
2. Our Algorithmic Overlords: There is of course a lot of overlap between concerns about digital finance and privacy and digital everything and privacy. One of the standard mantras of those gathering and selling data is that much of it is anonymized, so we shouldn't be concerned. But, of course, not so much. That's not just a concern in the US, because digital data-gathering is becoming a thing worldwide. Here's a plea to stop "stop surveillance humanitarianism." And here's a story about how a high-tech surveillance approach to improving disaster response turns out to have not been such a good idea (spoiler: garbage in/garbage out).
One of the major concerns about the use of algorithms in these situations is the garbage in/garbage out problem--combined with the gee-whiz veneer that technology provides obscuring that problem. I'm generally skeptical of that argument as a whole, because my experience is that people are far less likely to trust an algorithm than a human being (In some sense I wrote a whole book about it in a different application: the bogus fears that Toyotas were suddenly accelerating and trying to kill people). But there are other forms that algorithmic discrimination can take. Here's a story about a new US Housing and Urban Development regulation that would exempt landlords from responsibility for the discriminatory results of their screening practices as long as they don't understand the algorithm, which y'know is a given.
Finally, there is a new documentary about the 2016 US election, the Brexit referendum, Facebook/Cambridge Analytica, etc. called The Great Hack. Here's a piece about 7 things the documentary gets wrong which I find pretty convincing.
1. The Great (Household Finance) Convergence: I've been teasing this for awhile and now it's finally out: my essay for Aspen's Financial Security Program laying out the convergence between the US and developing, especially middle-income, countries especially when it comes to financial inclusion. The essay also highlights areas where mutual learning and collaboration should prove particularly fruitful. While you're there check out the rest of Aspen FSP's work on financial inclusion and keep an eye out for my next essay on "Reinvigorating the Financial Inclusion Agenda" (or, y'know, just wait until it shows up in the faiV; or you could check out this piece I did for CDC (UK) on the value of investing in financial system development).
Now the work for that essay was done a while ago, but the evidence for the convergence thesis (and it's related "corrupted economy" thesis) keeps coming. The past few weeks there were several stories in this vein. For instance, the growing number of American families relying on debt to pay their bills. Sorry, I meant the growing number of Russian families relying on debt to pay their bills. Sorry, I meant the growing number of post-retirement Americans relying on debt to pay their bills and being forced into bankruptcy.
2. Moving to Convergence?/Evidence-Based Policy: Here's a different area of convergence--my interests in the Great Convergence and in evidence-based policy in general and the RCT movement in particular. Part of the argument of the Great Convergence/Corrupted Economy is that the bottom 40% of the American income distribution faces an economy characterized by limited opportunity, with poor jobs, poor education, poor healthcare and housing that closely resembles the economies of middle-income countries. Escaping from these circumstances requires something akin to winning the lottery (Oh, did you hear about Virginia's new program for automatic purchases of lottery tickets? Set it and forget it!). People do win, but it's hard to justify the mental, physical, emotional and economic investment in hard work and building human capital when you are facing a lottery economy (and frequently witness things like this which don't seem to horrify very many people beyond Paddy Carter).
Perhaps you heard about or read the new paper from Chetty et al. on an experiment to revive the Moving to Opportunity program that showed next-generation benefits(but not much in terms of short-term benefits) from moving from poor neighborhoods to wealthier neighborhoods. The results from the experiment were met with a good bit of enthusiasm--here's Nick Kristof, and here's Dylan Matthews.
But the whole thing leaves me pretty uncomfortable for four reasons. One, the whole thing really is a lottery. Jake Vigdor does a good job in this thread of laying out the issues. First, the underlying program is literally a lottery. In fact, all housing assistance in Seattle is the functional equivalent of lottery. So to benefit from the program you would have had to win the lottery of applying for housing assistance at the right time, when there were slots open, and then when the lottery to get one of these vouchers specifically for this type of move.
Second, the program isn't an anti-poverty program as they are traditionally conceived of--it's a test of a program to encourage people who win the double lottery to follow through and actually move to higher-income neighborhood. It turns out that a remarkably small number of people who get housing vouchers like this actually use them--see above on the difficulty of motivating action in a lottery economy. The program works on its own terms--it significantly increases the percentage of people who actually move. But the anti-poverty effects in the theory of change won't be felt until the children of these movers become adults--at least 10 to 15 years from now.
Which raises the third issue. To really consider this an anti-poverty success you have to believe that the things that made the high-income neighborhoods in Seattle good for generational mobility 20 years ago, remain true today, AND that the labor market faced by today's kids will be same in 10 to 15 years further into the future. Those seem to me to be large assumptions.
It's not just that they seem so, the fourth reason is that they are large assumptions. Because the underlying mechanisms that lead to next-generation income mobility haven't been identified in any meaningful way. Other work by Chetty et al has documented the clear existence of high-mobility and low-mobility neighborhoods in the US--that work is a big part of what informs my views on the Great Convergence/Corrupted Economy. But it doesn't make it clear why the good neighborhoods are good, and therefore you have to believe that those factors are invariant over time, which maybe you shouldn't.
Here's the connection to evidence-based policy, and the fourth : this work and the reactions to it seem to me to be a much clearer example of the criticisms of RCTs by folks like Lant Pritchett, Angus Deaton, Glenn Harrison and Martin Ravallion than anything I've seen in the economic development space. You've got black boxes, large unexamined assumptions, a suspension of disbelief due to the methodology, and ultimately the possibility of gains so small (e.g. once you narrow from the winners of the lottery to the people who follow through to the kids who benefit; and all of this is just in one county in the whole country) that you should say, "so what?" instead of cheering.
By the way if you're interested in a different critique of this body of work, and other takes on economic mobility in the US, check out this thread from Scott Winship.
Wrapping up on the evidence-based policy front, it turns out that policy-makers have a lot of behavioral biases.
1. FinLit Redux: A few weeks ago I had an op-ed in the Washington Post bemoaning the ongoing emphasis on financial literacy training. David Evans had an issue with one particular sentence in that op-ed, not about financial literacy, but about the effectiveness of information interventions. Here's his list of 10 studies where providing information (alone) changes behavior. And I suppose my inclusion of this is another piece of evidence supporting his point? On the other hand, here's a long, rambling essay from the president of the (US) National Foundation for Financial Education which is one of the finest examples I've ever seen of not just moving the goalposts but denying they even exist. He's got all the greatest hits: don't evaluate based on current practice because we're changing; don't evaluate based on average practice, because of course there are bad programs; don't evaluate based on standard measures because programs vary; don't pay attention to negative stories because they are "old and tired"; and even, "hey look over there!" Is there an emoji for scream of helpless rage?
The reason I find such defenses so enraging is because the huge amount of resources being poured into financial literacy could be put to so much better use that actually are likely to help people. Here's a piece looking at one of the specific trade-offs: financial literacy distracts from the very real need to protect consumers from bad actors. That's not just theoretical. The (US) CFPB is actually shifting from consumer protection to education. Where's that scream of helpless rage emoji again?
2. Household Finance and Regulation: Thinking about consumer protection and the role and value of financial literacy requires thinking about household finance. Fred Wherry, Kristin Seefeldt and Anthony Alvarez have a short essay on how to think about these issues, with several sentences I wish I had written, including, "Stop treating the borrowers as if they are ignorant or irresponsible. And start treating the lenders as if they are inefficient (and sometimes malicious) providers of needed financial services."
There is a tension there, however, that I think too often gets short shrift. Consumer protection regulation necessarily involves removing some choices, and therefore some agency, from consumers. I hope to write more about this, but here is Anne Fleming, (author of City of Debtors which I've been citing frequently) writing aboutthe trade-offs in the caps on interest rates proposed by some prominent Democrats. Making those trade-offs also requires regulators to decide what consumers really want. And that's not always so clear--for instance, here's a look at how "social meaning of money" sociological frameworks do a better job of predicting behavior in retirement accounts than behavioral or rational actor models. And of course the needs and desires of consumers vary so you're not just trading-off between choice and protection but between the needs and desires of different consumers. Yes, this is a bit of a stretch, but here's an article about how women are carving out their own niche in a bit of the household finance world that has been dominated by white men.
Now I recognize that all of this so far is about things going on in the US. But as I frequently argue, the US has a lot more relevance to global conversations than is generally recognized. For instance, here's a story about Facebook turning into a platform for the kind of informal insurance networks we talk about so often in developing countries.
3. Digital Finance: That's a reasonable segue into digital finance, especially since the piece quotes Mark Zuckerberg's ambition to make money as easy to send as a picture (which, y'know, isn't actually very ambitious given that a billion+ people can already do that). But in Hong Kong a lot of them are choosing these days not to do it. Well, at least not to use digital tools to make purchases. Why? Because they are worried that the government will use the data trail to identify who is participating in protests. It's a well-founded worry not just in Hong Kong but around the world, and one that digital finance advocates should be taking much more seriously. And no, cryptocurrency is not in any way a solution for this.
1. Microfinance/Household Finance: I mentioned the Hrishipara Financial Diaries last week--it's a project Stuart Rutherford has been running in central Bangladesh for four years now. That's a truly unique data set of high frequency data on the financial lives of households. I also mentioned that Stuart is now funding the continuation of the diaries out of his own pocket. Don't make me beg for someone to step in with more funding so this dataset gets even more valuable. It's incredibly cheap by the way---hmm, maybe the first faiV GoFundMe? See, don't make me resort to such things!
Continuing in the wave of revisiting ideas about microfinance and it's impact, Bruce Wydick has "3 reasons the impact of microcredit might be bigger than we thought." Of course, the "we" in that sentence matters a lot. Mushfiq Mubarak and Vikas Dimble have a short review of microfinance research with handy links to the research we talk about most these days: evidence for ways that microfinance could innovate to increase impact. Of course, I have to return to the binding constraint on microfinance innovation: funding appropriate for investment in innovation.
2. Replication: I know what you're thinking: "Hey, I haven't heard about Worm Wars in a long time. What happened?" And so, let me bring you a new paper from Owen Ozier that reviews the history of the Worm Wars in an effort to understand the state of reproducibility in Economics and related topics. Here is Owen's Twitter thread with some "wild things" he learned working on the paper. And here's Annette Brown's replies (one, two, three) pointing out some longstanding errors in the literature on replication in economics--one lesson is that if you don't read the variable definitions you're likely to draw the wrong conclusions and others won't be able to replicate your work.
Here is an interesting argument that theory constrains degrees of researcher freedom more than experiment--that in fact one of the sources of the replication crisis is a lack of theoretical frameworks around empirical research. Oh, and that empirical work needs more formal mathematical models. In case you haven't figured it out yet, this is coming from the perspective of "behavioral sciences" which apparently does not include economics, where alot of recent argument has been about the need for experiments to constrain degrees of freedom and that "mathiness" is a problem. And here's Dorothy Bishop on "reining in the four horsemen of irreproducibility".
Inherent variability is not one of those four horsemen, but it is a plausible source of irreproducibility that has nothing to do with bad practices or researcher misbehavior. If reactions to stimuli vary a lot based on minor contextual factors (which is in fact one of the findings of behavioral sciences, albeit one that is itself subject to lots of questions about replication), then you should expect that the exact same experiment conducted at a different time and place with different subjects will yield different results. Whether that's the case is the subject of this debate between Simmons/Simonsohn, McShane/Bockenholt/Hansen (not that one), and Judd and Kenney (also not that one), all hosted by Andrew Gelman. It's worth the time to read through.
3. Research and Communications: Taking that conversation as a leaping off point, here's a new paper on demand effects in survey experiments. On the one hand, it may come as a relief to know that the paper doesn't find much evidence of experimenter demand effects. On the other hand, a lot of economics lab experiments are built on the idea that the experimenter can induce people to behave in certain ways with incentives--and when those incentives don't work, it's evidence of some other important factor operating. But, "Even financial incentives to respond in line with researcher expectations fail to consistently induce demand effects." I feel like this paper could not have been published in an economics journal, because the theory constraints (I'm particularly proud of this callback).
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